The Empirics of International Monetary Transmission: Identification and the Impossible Trinity by Bluedorn, John C. & Bowdler, Christopher
JOHN C. BLUEDORN
CHRISTOPHER BOWDLER
The Empirics of International Monetary
Transmission: Identification and the
Impossible Trinity
The transmission of monetary policy across borders is central to many open
economy models. Research has tried to evaluate the “impossible trinity”
through estimating international interest rate linkages under alternative ex-
change rate regimes using realized base country interest rates. Such interest
rates include anticipated and endogenous elements, which need not propa-
gate internationally. We compare international interest rate responses under
pegged and non-pegged regimes to identified, unanticipated, and exoge-
nous U.S. interest rate changes and realized U.S. interest rate changes. We
find important differences in estimated transmission from the two sets of
measures—identified interest rate changes demonstrate a greater concor-
dance with the impossible trinity than realized rate changes.
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THE IDEA THAT monetary policy autonomy depends on the
choice of exchange rate regime has long been prominent in international macroe-
conomics. According to the “impossible trinity” or open economy trilemma, when
capital is mobile a country that maintains a fixed (or pegged) exchange rate against a
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foreign currency must implement the foreign interest rate. In order to restore auton-
omy, the country in question must either abandon its exchange rate target and allow the
currency to float, or implement restrictions on capital mobility. The logic behind this
trade-off features in a number of well-known macroeconomic models, including the
textbook Mundell–Fleming model of fiscal and monetary policy in open economies
and the family of new, open economy macroeconomic models pioneered by Obstfeld
and Rogoff (1995).
A large empirical literature addresses the testable implications of the open econ-
omy trilemma. Flood and Rose (1995) and Rose (1996) examine trade-offs between
exchange rate volatility and measures of monetary divergence. They find either no
support or weak support for the trade-offs implied by the trilemma. More recently,
Miniane and Rogers (2007) identify U.S. interest rate shocks from structural vector
autoregressions (SVARs) and estimate their transmission to a range of foreign interest
rates. Consistent with the trilemma logic, the transmission to pegged exchange rate
regimes is stronger, although the effect is not significant at conventional levels. In
other recent work, the trilemma has been evaluated through a comparison of interest
rate pass-through, defined as the response of one country’s interest rate (e.g., Home)
to changes in another country’s interest rate (e.g., Foreign) across peg and non-peg
regimes.1 Recent examples include inter alia Frankel, Schmukler, and Serve´n (2004),
Shambaugh (2004), and Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2004, 2005).
A key question is whether interest rate pass-through is systematically higher under
pegs than non-pegs. In addressing this issue, Shambaugh (2004) emphasizes compar-
isons based upon de facto as opposed to de jure exchange rate regime classifications.
He reports evidence that a peg imposes a constraint on monetary policy in the form
of higher interest rate pass-through. By contrast, Frankel et al. (2004), using different
exchange rate regime classifications, find that full interest rate pass-through cannot
be rejected in many cases, even for non-pegs.
While the results obtained using de facto regime classifications suggest that ex-
change rate pegs are associated with constraints on monetary policy, the stronger
predictions from the simplest theory of the trilemma, namely, that when capital is
mobile pass-through to pegs is unity and pass-through to pure floats (non-pegs) is
zero, are generally rejected. The difference in interest rate pass-through across pegs
and non-pegs, which measures the constraint from pegging, is significantly smaller
than this theoretical benchmark. A number of explanations for deviations from unit
pass-through to pegs and zero pass-through to non-pegs have been proposed. Obst-
feld et al. (2005) show that narrow target zones for exchange rates (broadly classified
as pegs) can induce less than unit pass-through. At the other end of the spectrum,
“fear of floating” may partially constrain exchange rates under non-pegs, such that
pass-through exceeds zero.
In this paper, we provide a different perspective. We argue that the appropriate
interpretation of interest rate pass-through requires an understanding of the nature
1. Throughout the rest of the paper, we use Home to refer to the country whose interest rate is responding
and Foreign to refer to the country that originates an interest rate change.
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of foreign interest rate changes. Foreign (base country) interest rate changes that are
either anticipated or endogenous to foreign inflation will propagate differently than
will foreign rate changes that are both unanticipated and exogenous. In our empirical
analysis, we provide evidence that isolating unanticipated and exogenous U.S. inter-
est rate changes yields pass-through estimates closer to the theoretical benchmarks.
Associated with these findings, there is an increase in the pass-through differential
between pegs and non-pegs. However, the uncertainty attached to estimates of interest
rate pass-through from unanticipated and exogenous interest rate changes is such that
equal levels of pass-through from identified and realized U.S. interest rate changes
cannot be ruled out with high levels of confidence.
How might the identification of foreign interest rate changes matter? In practice,
interest rate changes are usually endogenous responses to macroeconomic conditions,
which may influence their international transmission. For example, when a foreign
interest rate rise is a response to foreign inflation or expected foreign inflation, the
pressure for an appreciation of the foreign currency (from the interest rate differential)
may be partly offset by pressure for depreciation, in order to stabilize the real exchange
rate in the face of the inflation shock. If the pressures for exchange rate adjustment
are muted, countries that peg to a foreign currency will be able to offset them without
fully accommodating the rise in foreign interest rates—pass-through will be less than
unity even when capital is mobile and the peg is perfectly credible.
A similar effect can arise via a different channel if foreign interest rate changes
are anticipated. Suppose that foreign interest rate increases are responses to funda-
mentals that are unlikely to attenuate exchange rate pressures (e.g., demand-driven
export growth) but that such policy moves are predictable. Substitution toward assets
denominated in the foreign currency may then occur prior to the actual foreign interest
rate increases, at the time at which information on fundamentals becomes available.
To stabilize the exchange rate against such currency flows, countries that peg to the
foreign currency must accommodate the foreign interest rate rise in advance of its
implementation. Interest rate linkages estimated from regressions of domestic interest
rates on current and past foreign interest rate movements will then be less than unity,
even though the maintenance of a peg does constrain domestic monetary policy.
In Section 1, we develop these arguments, describing how the nature of foreign
interest rate changes may affect pass-through to pegs and non-pegs. Analytically,
it turns out that the interest rate pass-through differential between pegs and non-
pegs may either increase or decrease, depending upon the nature of foreign interest
rate changes. The point we emphasize is that following actual foreign interest rate
changes, pass-through to pegs may be less than unity and pass-through to non-pegs
greater than zero. Consequently, the constraint on monetary policy from pegging can
be underestimated.
Our main contribution is thus to estimate interest rate pass-through to pegs and
non-pegs under capital mobility, after controlling for anticipated and endogenous
movements in foreign monetary policy. Taking the United States as the foreign coun-
try, we estimate and compare interest rate responses to unanticipated and exogenous
U.S. interest rate changes identified via two different approaches: an extension of the
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procedure pioneered by Romer and Romer (2004) and a Kuttner (2001) style proce-
dure. Romer and Romer’s approach allows us to isolate the component of intended
U.S. federal funds rate changes that is unrelated to the Federal Reserve Greenbook
(in-house) forecasts of U.S. output growth, inflation, and unemployment. Kuttner’s
approach allows us to calculate the unanticipated component of an intended federal
funds rate change using federal funds futures price changes around Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) meetings.
Our results indicate that within-month pass-through from an unanticipated and
exogenous U.S. interest rate change (based upon the extension of Romer and Romer
2004) is 0.78 for pegs and 0.08 for non-pegs. The corresponding estimates using
realized federal funds rate changes, which mix identified policy changes with those
that are partly anticipated and endogenous, are 0.52 and 0.16. The identification
of U.S. interest rate changes that are more plausibly unanticipated and exogenous
increases the distance between peg and non-peg estimates of within-month pass-
through from 0.36 to 0.70. In a sample of end-of-day interest rates, we find that
day-to-day pass-through from an identified U.S. interest rate change ranges from
0.69 to 1.01 for pegs and 0.10 to 0.44 for non-pegs, depending upon the identification
procedure employed. By contrast, estimated day-to-day pass-through from realized
federal funds rate changes is 0.20 for pegs and −0.03 for non-pegs.
The uncertainty associated with our estimates is large enough that we are unable to
reject the equality of pass-through from identified versus realized Foreign interest rate
changes. In particular, the 68% confidence interval (CI) for the difference between peg
and non-peg within-month pass-through from identified policy changes is [0.45,0.95]
and the 95% CI is [0.20,1.20]. Although the 68% CI excludes the differential esti-
mated using realized federal funds rate changes (in fact, the 68% CIs for the two
estimates do not overlap), the 95% CI includes it. The uncertainty associated with the
day-to-day pass-through estimates is larger still. This suggests that identical interest
rate transmission across anticipated/unanticipated and endogenous/exogenous U.S.
interest rate changes cannot be ruled out.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1, we discuss expected levels of interest
rate pass-through when foreign interest rate changes can be distinguished according
to their predictability and endogeneity. In Section 2, we describe our econometric
methodology and identification approaches. Section 3 contains our baseline results,
and in Section 4 we consider the robustness of these results to several important
extensions of our econometric procedures. We conclude in Section 5 with a summary
of our main arguments and findings.
1. INTEREST RATE PASS-THROUGH
In this section, we show how an international no-arbitrage condition is related
to a standard interest rate pass-through regression. For the case of perfect capital
mobility, we consider how estimated pass-through to imperfectly credible pegs and
non-pegs varies in response to foreign interest rate changes that differ according
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to their predictability and endogeneity. The conclusion that we emphasize is that
estimated interest rate transmission from realized interest rate changes may understate
the differences between pegs and non-pegs.
1.1 International No-Arbitrage Conditions and Interest Rates
Under capital mobility, international no-arbitrage conditions are expected to hold.
The standard covered interest rate parity (CIP) condition between similar Home and
Foreign fixed-income assets is
(1 + Rt ) =
(
1 + R∗t
) ( Ft
St
)
⇒ rt = r∗t + ft − st ,
where r = ln(1 + R), r∗ = ln(1 + R∗) , f = ln(F) and s = ln(S). R denotes the nom-
inal interest rate in decimal terms, F denotes the one-period ahead forward exchange
rate in units of Home currency per Foreign currency, and S denotes the nominal ex-
change rate in units of Home currency per Foreign currency. Foreign variables are
indicated by an asterisk. Suppose that the logarithm of the forward exchange rate is
defined as
ft = Et (st+1) + ρt ,
where ρ denotes the exchange rate risk premium associated with fixing a future
exchange rate trade of Foreign currency for Home currency today.2
Substituting this expression into the CIP condition, we have that
rt = r∗t +  [Et (st+1) − st ] + ρt ,
where the differencing is also done with respect to information sets.3 This leads
naturally to the following regression specification:
rt = α + βr∗t + ut ,
where α + ut =  [Et (st+1) − st ] + ρt .
(1)
The slope coefficient β is defined to be interest rate pass-through; it is a measure of
monetary codependence. This measure of pass-through is analyzed by Borensztein,
Zettelmeyer, and Philippon (2001), Shambaugh (2004), and Obstfeld et al. (2004,
2005). Frankel et al. (2004) evaluate the trilemma using a regression in interest rate
2. Note that the approximation ln Et (St+1) ≈ Et (ln St+1) = Et (st+1) is invoked. Assume that any errors
due to Siegel’s paradox (related to this approximation) are negligible. We use the term risk premium loosely.
From the perspective of economic theory, ρ is a composite of a Jensen’s inequality component (which is
important even for a risk-neutral investor) and a component embodying the utility valuation of risk (Engel
1992).
3. Specifically, the difference operator is [Et (st+1) − st ] = [Et (st+1) − st ] − [Et−1(st ) − st−1].
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levels, obtaining a related pass-through measure. In Section 2.3, we discuss how
inference may be influenced by such specification choices. For now, we confine our
discussion to inference associated with the first-difference specification.
Denote a variable in deviations form by a tilde, so that x˜t = xt − x¯ . The asymptotic
OLS estimate of β is given by
ˆβ = 1 +
cov
{
 ˜[Et (st+1) − st ], r˜∗t
}
+ cov {ρ˜t , r˜∗t }
var {r˜∗t }
.
A natural benchmark value for ˆβ is thus unity. If ˆβ is different from unity, then
(assuming that the CIP condition holds) it must be due to the presence of non-zero
covariances of Foreign interest rate changes with either the change in the expected
rate of depreciation from time (t − 1) to time t , or the change in the risk premium,
both of which are unobserved variables in the context of the interest rate pass-through
regression.
Previous empirical work has implicitly focused on the link between the unobserved
covariances and the exchange rate regime. In the case of a perfectly credible peg, the
unobserved covariances are zero because changes in the expected rate of depreciation
and the risk premium are always equal to zero. Estimated pass-through will then be
unity.4 In contrast, under a pure float without other economic interdependencies, the
change in the expected rate of depreciation exactly offsets the interest rate differential
in order to eliminate arbitrage opportunities. The unobserved covariances equal minus
the variance of the Foreign interest rate and pass-through will be zero.
In practice, pegged exchange rate regimes may not be perfectly credible. There
is then the possibility that exchange rate expectations adjust in response to foreign
interest rate changes (e.g., due to a change in the probability that a peg is abandoned).
In the remainder of this section, we explore how the predictability and endogeneity
of foreign interest rate changes may affect estimated pass-through. Our exploration
of foreign interest rate endogeneity in this context is narrow. We consider how non-
monetary innovations that raise foreign inflation may impact pass-through. Other
aspects of interest rate endogeneity may lead to different expected levels of pass-
through, and whether those effects dominate the ones we describe is an empirical
matter.
While the properties of foreign interest rate changes are our focus, we stress that
other factors may influence the unobserved covariances. Examples include frictions
to exchange rate and expectations adjustment (e.g., transactions costs and information
acquisition/processing costs), changes to the risk premium from the utility valuation
of risk, and linkages related to goods and asset markets. The latter may manifest as
common shocks (e.g., an increase in world oil prices may synchronize interest rate
increases across countries) and/or interdependence (e.g., an inflation innovation in
4. This is slightly oversimplified. More exactly, interest rate pass-through will be nearest unity under
a perfectly credible peg. It can be shown that the Jensen inequality component of the exchange rate risk
premium described by Engel (1992) can generate negative pass-through bias even under a credible peg.
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one country leads to a terms-of-trade change for its trading partners). Throughout our
discussion, we allude to how such factors may influence pass-through.
1.2 The Nature of Foreign Interest Rate Changes and Inference
Consider a binary exchange rate regime classification—peg and non-peg. Assume
that the peg is imperfectly credible. There is a perceived positive probability of a
change in the peg at some future time. Suppose that foreign interest rate changes
exert an effect on the foreign interest rate level that is at least partially persistent. In
the following thought experiments, we assume ρt = 0∀t . In general, if ρt moves
in the same direction as [Et (st+1) − s¯] following a Foreign interest rate change, our
baseline predictions are maintained.
How reasonable is such risk premium behavior? Using a Lucas (1982) style ex-
change rate model, Engel (1992) shows that Home-currency-denominated assets are
relatively riskier than Foreign assets if Home’s marginal utility covaries positively
with the exchange rate (e.g., consumption falls are associated with exchange rate de-
preciations). If the covariance of Home’s marginal utility and the exchange rate rises
with increases in the expected rate of depreciation, then the unobserved covariance of
risk premium changes with Foreign interest rate changes will have the same sign as
the unobserved covariance of the expected rate of depreciation with Foreign interest
rate changes. The predictions below then unambiguously follow.
The logic here is also applicable to the case where there is a difference in the
default risk associated with the underlying assets, which may be confounded with
the usual exchange rate risk premium. If Home’s marginal utility covaries positively
with the risk differential and this in turn covaries positively with the exchange rate,
then the below predictions again follow. For our application, we carefully match
overnight interest rate series across countries. Any variation in risk differentials for
the underlying assets should be minimal, given the short maturity of the assets.
Pegged exchange rate regimes. Suppose that a Foreign interest rate increase occurs at
time t that is both unanticipated and exogenous to non-monetary innovations. For an
imperfectly credible peg, interest rate pass-through from such a change will be greater
than unity. The market’s expected rate of depreciation will rise (Et (st+1) > st = s¯)
at the time the Foreign interest rate increase occurs, even if Home increases interest
rates contemporaneously by an identical amount. The perceived positive probability
of devaluation and the pressure for a larger exchange rate adjustment interact to
give this result. There is thus a positive covariance of the change in the expected
rate of depreciation with the Foreign interest rate change, leading to ˆβ > 1. Home
must compensate investors for any expected devaluation following the change in
fundamentals. For concreteness, we have assumed here that the regime is maintained.
We carry this assumption throughout to simplify our discussion.
Suppose that a Foreign interest rate increase occurs at time t that is anticipated
one period ahead and exogenous (e.g., a preannounced change in the composition of
the FOMC’s voting membership that represents a shift in central bank preferences).
For an imperfectly credible peg, interest rate pass-through from such a change will
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be less than unity. The market’s future expected rate of depreciation will rise for
the reasons set out above (Et−1(st ) > st−1 = s¯) before the interest rate rise occurs
(r∗t−1 = 0). This generates a negative covariance of the difference in the expected
rate of depreciation with the Foreign interest rate change, leading to ˆβ < 1. Home
raises interest rates before Foreign to compensate investors for the increased expected
depreciation rate. Such preemptive action weakens the empirical correlation between
the two interest rate series.
Suppose that a Foreign interest rate increase occurs at time t that is unanticipated
and endogenous to a Foreign inflation innovation. For an imperfectly credible peg,
interest rate pass-through from such a change will be less than unity. If the real
exchange rate is mean reverting, Foreign inflation encourages Foreign depreciation,
since the internal purchasing power of Foreign currency is diluted. If the purchasing
power dilution countervails any expected appreciation of Foreign’s currency from
the Foreign interest rate increase, the market’s expected rate of Home depreciation
will fall (Et (st+1) < st = s¯) at the time the interest rate rise occurs (r∗t > 0). This
generates a negative covariance of the difference in the expected rate of depreciation
with the Foreign interest rate change, leading to ˆβ < 1. Intuitively, the increases in
Foreign inflation and Foreign interest rates exert offsetting effects on the exchange
rate, such that the pressure for exchange rate adjustment is muted; Home can maintain
its peg without fully accommodating Foreign’s interest rate increase.
Finally, suppose that a Foreign interest rate increase occurs at time t = 1 that is
anticipated one period ahead and endogenous to a Foreign inflation innovation. For an
imperfectly credible peg, interest rate pass-through from such a change will be greater
than unity. Similar to the reasoning in the previous case for an endogenous Foreign
interest rate change, the market’s expected rate of depreciation will fall (Et−1(st ) <
st−1 = s¯) before the interest rate rise occurs (r∗t−1 = 0). This generates a positive
covariance of the difference in the expected rate of depreciation with the Foreign
interest rate change, leading to ˆβ > 1. See Table 1 for a summary of the signs predicted
for the unobserved covariances under the above Foreign interest rate taxonomy.
As noted earlier, other aspects of endogenous Foreign monetary policy may gener-
ate different effects on pass-through (e.g., a positive Foreign export demand shock).
Our purpose here is not to be exhaustive in our consideration of endogenous inter-
est rate changes but to propose a possible mechanism by which interest rate pass-
through to pegs may be underestimated using actual Foreign interest rate changes.
This motivates the empirical work that we undertake. That said, how reasonable is the
TABLE 1
UNOBSERVED COVARIANCE SIGN PREDICTIONS FOR THE FOREIGN INTEREST RATE CHANGE UNDER A PEG
Endogeneity property
Predictability property Exogenous Endogenous
Unanticipated + −
Anticipated − +
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assumption that endogenous Foreign interest rate increases are correlated with For-
eign depreciations?
Engel and Frankel (1984) demonstrate how an interest rate rise may be associated
with a Foreign depreciation when the Foreign interest rate rise reflects an increase
in the inflation premium (due to unintended money growth in their paper). More
recently, Drazen and Hubrich (2006) argue that interest rate increases can indicate
weak fundamentals, which depreciate the currency. Supporting the notion that weak
fundamentals may induce depreciation, Faust et al. (2007) find that the U.S. dollar
depreciates in high frequency data after news announcements indicating a higher than
expected consumer price index (CPI). However, Clarida and Waldman (2008) remark
that such announcements could appreciate the exchange rate if they prompt sufficiently
large interest rate increases. The critical theoretical determinant is the aggressiveness
of the central bank response to inflation. For the United States, Clarida and Waldman
do not find any evidence of exchange rate appreciation in response to inflationary
news. These papers provide some basis for the exchange rate effects that underpin
our pass-through predictions following endogenous Foreign interest rate changes.
In this subsection, we have focused upon a hard peg that is not perfectly credible.
What is the likely pattern of interest rate pass-through under target zone exchange rate
regimes? Target zones allow for some flexibility in the exchange rate in the current
period, such that the change in the expected rate of depreciation from a foreign interest
rate change is reduced. This implies that values of the covariance of foreign interest
rate changes and the expected rate of depreciation set out earlier in this subsection,
will be attenuated, such that biases in interest rate pass-through under target zones
will be smaller than under hard pegs.
Obstfeld et al. (2005) simulate interest rate pass-through under a target zone regime
when Home interest rates respond to domestic fundamentals (appropriately defined).
They demonstrate that the correlation of a target zone country’s fundamentals with
the base country’s interest rate is an important determinant of estimated pass-through.
This approach has implications for the transmission of unanticipated and exogenous
monetary policy. For low interest rate pass-through to arise under a target zone in
response to an unanticipated and exogenous Foreign interest rate change, domestic
fundamentals should be positively related to exchange rate expectations and negatively
related to Foreign interest rate changes. For example, if a foreign interest rate rise
induces recession, there will be pressure for Home interest rates to fall, even from
unanticipated and exogenous interest rate changes. As the target zone width grows,
the effect becomes larger.
Non-pegged exchange rate regimes. If the international no-arbitrage condition is the
only connection between Home and Foreign, the expected rate of depreciation under
a non-peg will respond one for one in the opposite direction to a Foreign interest rate
increase that is both unanticipated and exogenous. This implies that the unobserved
covariance is exactly equal to minus the variance of the Foreign interest rate change,
leading to ˆβ = 0.
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When a Foreign interest rate increase is anticipated and exogenous, the unobserved
covariance will be positive, since Home’s exchange rate jump depreciates one period
before the Foreign interest rate increase, simultaneously causing a decrease in Home’s
expected rate of depreciation. As the expected rate of depreciation falls one period
prior to the Foreign interest rate increase, the unobserved covariance will be positive.
A positive unobserved covariance also arises following an unanticipated and endoge-
nous Foreign interest rate increase, since Home’s exchange rate jump appreciates
contemporaneously, leading to an increase in Home’s expected rate of depreciation.
In contrast, when a Foreign interest rate increase is anticipated and endogenous,
the increase in the expected rate of depreciation occurs one period earlier than in
the unanticipated and endogenous case, yielding a negative unobserved covariance.5
Estimated pass-through under a non-peg will reflect the unobserved covariances as-
sociated with the dominant properties of the Foreign interest rate. Thus, the exact
level of pass-through to non-pegs is an empirical issue.
More generally, pass-through following a Foreign interest rate change will re-
flect the nature of any economic interdependencies between Home and Foreign. For
example, common shocks to the economies of Home and Foreign (e.g., world oil
price hikes), may induce similar endogenous interest rate increases, raising pass-
through. Alternatively, suppose Home’s economy expands following a real exchange
rate depreciation due to trade links between Home and Foreign. The attendant infla-
tionary pressure for Home may lead to a Home interest rate increase, raising pass-
through. The latter case is interesting because it implies that unanticipated and exoge-
nous Foreign interest rate changes may be associated with positive pass-through to
non-pegs.
2. ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY AND DATA
In this section, we describe the methodology that we use to evaluate how interest
rate pass-through under different exchange rate regimes is related to the nature of
foreign interest rate changes. The approach involves comparing estimated interest
rate pass-through to pegs and non-pegs following: an identified, unanticipated, and
exogenous U.S. interest rate change; and the realized federal funds rate change, which
represents a mixture of the properties outlined in Section 1. We divide the discus-
sion into three parts: (i) identification of unanticipated and exogenous U.S. federal
funds rate changes, (ii) exchange rate regime classification schemes, and (iii) the
econometric model specification and its estimation.
5. Note that the unobserved covariances for a particular type of interest rate change under a non-peg is
always of opposite sign to that noted for the same type of interest rate change in the peg case. Why? Under
a peg, the expected rate of depreciation is calculated assuming that the peg is maintained in the current
period but may adjust to the equilibrium non-peg value in the future. Under a non-peg, the equilibrium
value is immediately achieved since the exchange rate is a jump variable. Thus, the expected rates of
depreciation in the two cases will necessarily be of opposite signs according to the international no-arbitrage
condition.
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2.1 The Nature of Interest Rate Changes and Identification
We consider two identification approaches to isolate unanticipated and exogenous
U.S. federal funds rate changes. The first approach is an extension of the procedure
outlined by Romer and Romer (2004), which is based upon combining information on
intended U.S. policy rate changes and the Federal Reserve’s in-house macroeconomic
forecasts. The second approach follows Kuttner’s (2001) procedure, which is based
upon the information embodied in the federal funds futures market prices.
Intended U.S. monetary policy changes and macroeconomic forecasts. Romer and
Romer (2004) consider U.S. monetary policy over the period 1969–96. They employ a
two-step procedure to isolate unanticipated and exogenous changes in U.S. monetary
policy, as captured by the federal funds rate. In the first step, narrative evidence is
used to determine the size of the federal funds rate change targeted by the FOMC at
its scheduled meetings. In the second step, the targeted federal funds rate change is
regressed upon the Federal Reserve’s Greenbook (in-house) forecasts of real output
growth, inflation, and unemployment over horizons of up to 6 months. These represent
the central objective variables of the Federal Reserve (see Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve 2005, or the International Banking Act of 1978 (the Humphrey-
Hawkins Act)). The real-time forecasts are conditional upon the assumption that no
policy action is taken at the meeting for which they are formulated; they represent
the Federal Reserve’s best estimate of the economy’s path in the absence of active
policy. Accordingly, their use in the second-step regression allows for the real-time
unanticipated and exogenous component of monetary policy to be properly isolated.
Formally, Romer and Romer estimate the following regression:6
ffm = α + βffm−1 +
2∑
j=−1
γ j̂ym, j +
2∑
j=−1
λ j (̂ym, j − ̂ym−1, j )
+
2∑
j=−1
ϕ j πˆm, j +
2∑
j=−1
θ j (πˆm, j − πˆm−1, j ) + ρnˆm, j=0 + εm , (2)
where m indexes FOMC meetings, j indexes the quarter relative to the current meet-
ing’s quarter, ff is the target federal funds rate, y is real output growth, π is inflation,
n is the unemployment rate, a hat denotes the real-time forecast for a variable, and ε
is an error term. Other Greek letters denote population parameters.
The residuals from this regression are the targeted interest rate changes which
are orthogonal to the Federal Reserve’s economic forecasts. In Section 2, we argued
that changes to monetary policy that are orthogonal to expected inflation should be
used to evaluate interest rate pass-through, whereas this identification also controls
6. Employing real-time views/information, Orphanides (2003, 2004) finds that Federal Reserve behav-
ior is remarkably stable over time. This implies that the estimation of a single, time-invariant real-time
response for the Federal Reserve is an appropriate restriction.
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for forecasts for real variables. The latter can be interpreted as proxies for expected
inflation at horizons beyond two quarters, or as a means of controlling for monetary
policy movements that are predictable from a market perspective (market information
does not include the Greenbook forecasts, but may be correlated with the Greenbook
forecasts).
How successful is this method likely to be in isolating unanticipated and exogenous
monetary policy? Romer and Romer (2000) and Bernanke and Boivin (2003) demon-
strate that the Greenbook forecasts encompass alternative private sector forecasts. To
the extent that economic forecasts are the main driver of anticipated and endogenous
policy, the residuals are likely to be both unanticipated from the perspective of the
market, and orthogonal to the effects of any non-monetary innovations affecting the
economy captured in the forecasts.7
In a recent contribution, Faust and Wright (2008) highlight that Greenbook fore-
casts are conditional upon a specific path for the intended federal funds rate, which
presumes no change to the target at the current meeting but the possibility of target
changes at future meetings. To the extent that these assumptions over future policy are
incorrect, endogenous policy changes may contaminate the identified shock series.
Similarly, there may be other sources of anticipated policy changes which are not
fully accounted for by the Greenbook forecasts. If these endogenous or anticipated
changes are important, the pass-through estimates after applying the identification
procedure will be pulled toward the estimates from actual U.S. interest rate changes.
To address such concerns, we also consider results from an alternative identification
procedure, which we describe in the next subsection.
In order to update the Romer and Romer (2004) monetary policy identification from
1996 to 2000, we extend the series for ffm using the change in the target federal funds
rate that was announced after each FOMC meeting since 1994. From 1994 to 1996
inclusive, both the Romer and Romer identified, intended federal funds rate change
and the announced, target federal funds rate change are available—their correlation
is essentially 1.8 Given such consonance, we argue that the pooling of the two series
is defensible. We perform the forecast orthogonalization described above with a set
of Greenbook forecasts updated to the end of 2000.9 To evaluate pass-through to
interest rates at the monthly frequency, we take the meetings-based residuals from
regression (2) estimated through 2000 and cumulate them to give a daily level series.
We then average across days within a month, in order to obtain average level series at
7. Recently, Romer and Romer (2008) evaluate the forecasting properties of the FOMC member fore-
casts relative to the Greenbook forecasts and find that the Greenbook forecasts consistently encompassed
the FOMC member forecasts (despite being conditional forecasts). If FOMC member decisions respond to
their own private forecasts, any resulting change in policy stance represents a valid unanticipated and exoge-
nous monetary policy change. Why? After controlling for the Greenbook, there is no evidence that FOMC
member forecasts predict the future path of the economy. Consequently, any residual policy response to
the FOMC member forecasts may be considered exogenous.
8. There is one instance in which the series differ. For the meeting on September 28, 1994, Romer and
Romer argue that the language associated with the FOMC transcripts amounted to the intention to tighten
by 12.5 basis points, even though there was no change in the announced, target federal funds rate.
9. The results that we report in Section 3 are robust when estimated using a sample that ends in 1996m12
(viz., using only the original Romer and Romer 2004 series).
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the monthly frequency. We then take the first difference of the natural log of one plus
the decimalized level series, to obtain empirical counterparts to the Foreign interest
rate change (r∗t introduced in Section 1.1). The resulting series are comparable to
the monthly average observations for Home and Foreign interest rate changes that
will be used in other parts of the empirical work.
We also construct a purely meeting-based series of unanticipated and exogenous
U.S. monetary policy changes using the Romer and Romer (2004) identification
approach, spanning October 1988 to December 2000. This covers the period for which
we are able to calculate federal funds futures price-based unanticipated monetary
policy changes (described in the next section). The meeting-based residuals from the
Romer and Romer orthogonalization regression are mapped to the dates within the
period when the FOMC meeting outcomes were effectively known by the market
(again, described below). For the rest of the paper, we denote the target/Greenbook-
based unanticipated and exogenous U.S. interest rate change by UM (unanticipated
monetary policy). Changes in the realized federal funds rate are denoted by FF.
Federal funds futures price changes. The federal funds futures market was established
in October 1988 by the Chicago Board of Trade. Futures contracts are written on
a monthly basis. They are settled upon the history of the effective federal funds
rate within the contract month. Consequently, from their inception onward, Kuttner
(2001) is able to use the daily change in the market price of the current month futures
contract around Federal Reserve monetary policy interventions to infer the size of the
unanticipated component of U.S. monetary policy changes. The procedure involves
scaling the day-to-day difference in closing prices for the current month futures
contract on the day of a Federal Reserve intervention. Specifically, the unanticipated
component is calculated as
ut,s = −
(
Ds
Ds − t + 1
)
( ft,s − ft−1,s),
where the intervention occurs on day t in month/year s, Ds is the number of days
in month/year s, ft,s is the closing price of the federal funds futures contract for
month/year s, and ut,s is the unanticipated component of the intervention. Near the
end of the month, the scaling factor grows extremely large, potentially magnifying the
influence of any noise in price movements. Consequently, Kuttner recommends that
the unscaled change in next-month’s federal funds futures contract be used whenever
the date of an intervention occurs in the last 3 days of the month.10
We follow Kuttner’s (2001) procedure with a few modifications. First, we only con-
sider U.S. monetary policy actions (or inactions) that are associated with scheduled
FOMC meetings (similar to the Romer and Romer 2004 approach). Second, the dates
when monetary policy actions are revealed to the market are determined according to
10. If the intervention occurs on the first day of the month, the change is calculated from the difference
between the current month contract price and the next-month contract price from the last day of the previous
month.
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the method described in Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). Roughly speaking, over the
period October 1988 to January 1994, this means that we use the scaled difference
between the closing price from the day after the concluding date of an FOMC meet-
ing and the price from the FOMC meeting’s concluding date. From February 1994
onward, we take the scaled difference between the closing price from the day of the
concluding date of an FOMC meeting and the price from the day prior to the FOMC
meeting’s concluding date.11 Finally, based upon Hamilton’s (2007) findings regard-
ing the influence of noise in the federal funds futures prices, we take the unscaled
change in the next-month contract price whenever the date of an intervention occurs
in the last 20% of a month.12
For the rest of the paper, we denote the futures-identified U.S. interest rate change
by FF-FUT. A possible concern with FF-FUT is that it still includes components of
endogenous policy to the extent that the Federal Reserve has better information about
the economy’s future path than the market. In related work, we provide some evidence
that shocks identified via the Kuttner (2001) method from the federal funds futures
market are comparable to those identified using the combination of the intended
federal funds rate and Greenbook information (Bluedorn and Bowdler 2008). Such
cross-validation is reassuring. It suggests not only that FF-FUT is comparatively
free of endogenous policy components but also that UM is comparatively free of
anticipated policy components.
We argue that the identification approaches employed here will minimize biases,
not only compared to the realized federal funds rate but also compared to policy
shocks from SVARs, such as those employed by Miniane and Rogers (2007) in their
study of international monetary transmission. The latter approach relies on current
and lagged values of output, prices, and other variables to control for policy changes
that are either endogenous to forecasted economic conditions or anticipated from
market information. If the Greenbook forecasts contain information over and above
that included in the VAR to which policymakers react, then the identification will not
isolate unanticipated and exogenous monetary policy. A similar argument applies if
the futures market possesses information over and above that included in the VAR
about expected policymaker actions.
2.2 Exchange Rate Regime Classification and Inclusion Criteria
In investigating the monetary policy trilemma, Shambaugh (2004) constructs a de
facto binary exchange rate regime classification for a sample of up to 155 countries
by analyzing monthly time series data on the exchange rate for the currency of a
local country against the currency of a base country.13 This is the exchange rate
11. FOMC policy decisions at a meeting have been publicly announced since February 1994. See the
data set documentation for a more detailed explanation of the differencing.
12. We also tried the more elaborate corrections for the federal funds futures-based unanticipated
monetary policy measure that Hamilton (2007) advocates. The results for daily interest rate pass-through
were broadly similar, leading us to opt for the simpler Kuttner (2001) formulation.
13. For a full explanation of his classification methodology, see Shambaugh (2004).
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regime classification that we employ in the main part of our analysis (alternative
classifications are considered in Section 4.3). Shambaugh collected monthly data on
exchange rates for each country’s currency versus all major global currencies and any
major regional currencies. If a currency stayed within 2% of a central value against
a major currency throughout a particular year, the major currency was defined as the
base against which the local currency was pegged. Otherwise, the exchange rate was
defined as a non-peg. In total, the exchange rate regime classification generates an
unbalanced panel covering 155 countries over the years 1972–2000. To parallel the
treatment of pegs, Shambaugh defined a base country for those countries that were
classified as non-pegs. The base was either a country of historical importance for the
local country, a nearby dominant economy to which other currencies were pegged,
or the United States.
Approximately 50% of the country/year observations have the United States as
the base country. To maximize the sample available for contrasting the interest rate
consequences of UM and FF (defined for the United States), we reclassify non-U.S.
base observations as follows: (i) if a country pegs its currency versus a base currency
that is pegged to the U.S. dollar, then the country in question is classified as a peg
versus the U.S. dollar, (ii) if a country pegs its currency versus a currency that is
not pegged to the U.S. dollar, it is classified as a non-peg versus the U.S. dollar, and
(iii) if a country’s currency is not pegged when the base is a country other than the
United States, it is treated as a non-peg versus the U.S. dollar. In implementing the
reclassification, we check that each of the bilateral relationships are characterized by
capital mobility, to ensure that the reclassified observations are comparable to those
for which the United States was originally identified as the base country.14 Finally, for
countries which joined the Eurozone in January 1999, we use observations through
the end of 1998, and we introduce a new country, Eurozone, for the period 1999–
2000. The Eurozone is classified as a non-peg versus the U.S. dollar. We denote the
extended binary exchange rate regime classification variable by P , where P = 1 for
a peg and P = 0 for a non-peg.
2.3 Model Specification and Sample
To measure interest rate pass-through, we estimate static panel regressions of the
following form:
ri,t =
(
αP + β Pr∗i,t
) · Pi,t + (αN P + βN Pr∗i,t) · (1 − Pi,t ) + εi,t , (3)
where i indexes countries, t indexes time,  is a difference operator, ε is a mean-
zero error term, and all variables are defined as in equation (1). Superscripts P and
N P denote peg and non-peg regime coefficients. Such a model is typical of the
14. As it ends up, the procedure described here only increases the size of the non-peg sample. All of our
results are qualitatively the same when using only the peg and non-peg observations originally identified
by Shambaugh (2004) for the United States.
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literature investigating the trilemma (Shambaugh 2004, Obstfeld et al. 2004, 2005).15
All of the specifications that we employ assume that the slope coefficients are common
across countries, similar to previous work.16 By focusing on a sample of countries
that do not maintain capital controls, we eliminate an important potential source of
parameter heterogeneity. Formal evidence relating to this issue was obtained from
tests of cross-sectional parameter homogeneity at both the monthly and daily fre-
quencies (see Appendix Table A3). For specifications using UM and FF-FUT, the
tests tend to support pooling. For specifications using FF, there is evidence of het-
erogeneity in monthly responses but not daily responses. Such heterogeneity affects
all of the previous work that relies upon realized foreign interest rates analogous
to FF.
Given our interest in estimating international transmission, it may seem natural
to control for domestic factors such as Home inflation or Home output growth to
account for some endogenous Home interest rate movements. However, the inclusion
of such variables would complicate the identification of interest rate pass-through.
For example, recall that estimated pass-through depends upon the covariance of the
change in the Foreign interest rate with the change in the expected rate of depreciation.
If Home’s current inflation is a function of the exchange rate’s expected rate of
depreciation, then its inclusion in the regression will remove part of the unobserved
covariance which is critical to the predictions set out in Section 1. Consequently, as is
standard in much of the literature, we estimate pass-through without controlling for
macroeconomic variables in the Home country.17
The models at the monthly frequency are estimated in first differences, relating
monthly Foreign interest rate changes to monthly Home interest rate changes. For
the models at the daily frequency, Home interest rate changes are defined to be the
difference between the Home interest rate on day t + 2 from its value on day t − 1,
assuming that the FOMC meeting associated with the Foreign interest rate occurs
on day t .18 Econometrically, the specification is valid if the interest rate data are
stationary, or nonstationary and not cointegrated. However, if they are cointegrated,
the models that we estimate are misspecified due to the absence of an error correction
term to capture long-run convergence (Hendry 1995). As a check, we augmented the
specifications with an error correction term and found that it did not affect any of our
main conclusions.
15. Frankel et al. (2004) additionally condition upon the realized inflation differential in a levels
regression but find that it has virtually no effect upon estimated pass-through.
16. We also restrict the intercepts to be identical across countries within regimes. If we allow for
country-regime fixed effects, there is little change in the results.
17. On a related point, it is important to use realized Home interest rates to get an accurate measure
of pass-through, rather than an exogenous measure that adjusts for endogenous policy, given that Home’s
interest rate responses to Foreign’s interest rate changes are examples of endogenous monetary policy.
18. Note that Foreign interest rate changes in the daily data are not transformed to be the change in the
logarithm of 1 plus the Foreign interest rate level. They are rather the raw, identified U.S. monetary policy
change, as described in Section 2.1. Since the implied interest level and interest rate change are small
over the daily data period, the usual Taylor approximation for the logarithmic transformation is extremely
accurate.
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For the models at the monthly frequency, the Home interest rate that we use is
the period average overnight money market rate for a country’s own-currency, taken
from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) International Financial Statistics. For
the models at the daily frequency, the Home interest rate is the end-of-day overnight
interest rate, taken from a variety of sources (see Appendix Table A2 for details). As
overnight rates, they are roughly comparable to the U.S. federal funds rate, which is
the basis for the Foreign interest rate measures we employ.
The sample consists of country/time observations from years during which there
are no restrictions on capital mobility, as reported in the IMF’s Annual Report on Ex-
change Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) and codified by Sham-
baugh (2004). We exclude observations associated with capital controls since the
predictions set out in Section 1 rely on a no-arbitrage condition, which is unlikely
to hold when legal restrictions apply to the movement of capital. In Section 4.2, we
consider the robustness of our results to an alternative capital controls measure based
upon the work by Chinn and Ito (2006, 2008).
To ensure that we use only established peg and no capital control observations
in the estimation, we also exclude the first month immediately after the removal of
capital controls and the first month after the institution of a peg regime. Similar to
Shambaugh (2004), we exclude a small number of observations corresponding to hy-
perinflations or periods of administratively set interest rates (additionally, we exclude
the month immediately after the end of such episodes, to ensure that interest rate
changes used in the empirical work do not draw on them). We follow Shambaugh’s
classification of hyperinflation years in constructing both the monthly and daily data
sets. We update Shambaugh’s classification of administratively set interest rates at
the annual frequency using information on monthly interest rate changes. We add
observations when there is within-year variation in monthly interest rates. Similarly,
we exclude some observations relative to the sample that would have been obtained
using Shambaugh’s annual coding, because we find long periods in which there are
no within-year interest rate changes in the monthly data.19
After applying the inclusion criteria, the monthly sample consists of 37 coun-
tries (including the Eurozone), covering the period 1973m02–2000m12. Peg obser-
vations occur for 8 of these countries and the average length of a country/regime time
series is 61 months for pegs and 104 months for non-pegs. The baseline sample com-
prises 5,072 pairs of monthly interest rate changes, with 12% of the total relating
to pegs. Pegs are a smaller percentage of our baseline sample than was the case in
the sample used by Shambaugh (2004) because of our focus on only those countries
that are pegged to the U.S. dollar and for which an overnight interest rate series ex-
ists. However, the absolute sizes of the samples are always large enough that we are
confident in their statistical efficacy.
19. The additional inclusions (after taking account of the other inclusion criteria) from the update to
the administratively set indicator are Kuwait 1979m2:1980m12, and the Maldives 1989m7:1989m12 and
1993m2:1993m12. The additional exclusions (again, after taking account of the other inclusion criteria)
are Niger in 1995:1996, Vanuatu 1987m1:1988m1 and 1990m1:1992m1, and Hong Kong 1994m1 (the
observation for Hong Kong is excluded because it represents the first month after a long period of no
change in the interest rate).
696 : MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING
The daily sample consists of 23 countries (including the Eurozone), drawing from
the period 1988m11–2000m12. Due to the limited temporal coverage, sample size is
more of a concern for the daily data. Peg observations occur for only three of these
countries. The baseline sample comprises 1,532 pairs of day-to-day interest rate
changes, with pegs accounting for 7.4% of the total. When considering the results in
Section 3.2, we discuss sample size issues. A description of the monthly and daily
samples and the variables used (with sources) is provided in Appendix Tables A1
and A2.
Standard error considerations. As described in Section 2.1, UM is a generated regres-
sor. To account for the additional sampling uncertainty introduced by its generation,
standard errors are calculated via bootstrapping. Specifically, we resample the data
1,000 times by drawing pairs of observations with replacement, reestimate the model
for each bootstrap sample, and calculate the standard error of the resulting coefficient
distribution. The paired bootstrap procedure is robust to heteroskedasticity but not to
serial correlation of the errors (Brownstone and Valletta 2001). As seen in Appendix
Table A3, we cannot reject the null of AR(1) serially uncorrelated errors at the 1%
level in any instance and cannot reject at the 5% level in most instances (other diag-
nostics that we do not report also provide strong evidence that higher order error serial
correlation is not present). In order to check that our inferences are not affected by
possible serial correlation, we also calculated standard errors clustered at the country
level to allow for arbitrary within-cluster autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. Stan-
dard errors calculated via this procedure are actually smaller than the bootstrapped
standard errors that we report, and provide somewhat stronger support for the results
that we present in Section 3. Even in the presence of generated regressors, inference
against a zero null hypothesis with clustered standard errors will still be valid (Pagan
1984).
Uncertainty from generated regressors is not an issue when FF or FF-FUT is em-
ployed. However, to ensure comparability, we calculate bootstrapped standard errors
for models where FF or FF-FUT is an explanatory variable. The bootstrapped standard
errors are nearly identical to clustered standard errors in all cases.
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We now present our empirical results, first for monthly data and then for daily
data.
3.1 Pass-Through Estimates from Monthly Data
In the top half of Table 2, we report within-month pass-through under pegs and
non-pegs following changes in UM and FF. We also present: (i) a test of the the null
hypothesis of unit pass-through, (ii) the difference between peg and non-peg pass-
through and its standard error, and (iii) a test of the null hypothesis of unit pass-through
to pegs and zero pass-through to non-pegs.
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TABLE 2
BASELINE INTEREST RATE PASS-THROUGH
U.S. interest Exchange rate H0: β = 1 H0: βP = 1,
rate measure regime β (p-value) N R2 βP − βNP βNP = 0 (p-value)
Monthly frequency
UM Peg 0.78∗∗ 0.30 607 0.015 0.70∗∗ 0.47
(0.22) (0.25)
Non-peg 0.08 0.00 4,465 0.0001
(0.10)
FF Peg 0.52∗∗ 0.00 607 0.027 0.36∗∗ 0.00
(0.09) (0.09)
Non-peg 0.16∗∗ 0.00 4,465 0.002
(0.05)
Daily frequency
UM Peg 0.69 0.53 114 0.020 0.51 0.73
(0.51) (0.63)
Non-peg 0.17 0.01 1,418 0.0001
(0.33)
FF-FUT Peg 1.01 0.99 114 0.017 0.52 0.66
(0.88) (1.03)
Non-peg 0.49 0.34 1,418 0.0003
(0.53)
FF Peg 0.20 0.00 114 0.013 0.25 0.00
(0.16) (0.19)
Non-peg −0.05 0.00 1,418 0.0001
(0.12)
NOTES: Pass-through statistics measure the within month or day-to-day response of Home interest rates to a 1 percentage point increase in
(i) UM, the unanticipated and exogenous US interest rate measure; (ii) FF, the aggregate intended federal funds rate; and (iii) FF-FUT, the
federal funds futures-based monetary policy shock (only for the daily data). The construction of the U.S. interest rate measures at the two
frequencies is described in the main text. The monthly data cover the period 1972m1–2000m12. The daily data are drawn from 1988m10
to 2000m12. The daily data are the changes in interest rates around scheduled FOMC meetings, as defined in the main text. The exchange
rate regime indicator and underlying capital mobility indicator are both from Shambaugh (2004). Standard errors are given in parentheses. ∗
and ∗∗ denote significance at 5% and 1%, respectively. All standard errors and hypothesis test results are based on bootstrapped covariance
matrices that use 1,000 replications.
In response to a 100 basis point (b.p.) tightening of U.S. monetary policy, within-
month pass-through to pegs is 78 b.p. when policy is measured using UM and 52 b.p.
when measured using FF. The amount by which interest rate pass-through deviates
from unity is roughly halved when a measure of foreign monetary policy that mixes
anticipated/unanticipated and endogenous/exogenous interest rate changes is replaced
by one that isolates unanticipated and exogenous changes. The 68% CI for pass-
through to pegs from UM is [0.56,1.00], and the 95% CI is [0.34,1.22]. Unit pass-
through and greater than unit pass-through to pegs (the natural benchmark discussed
in Section 1.1), cannot be ruled out, but this in part reflects the estimation uncertainty.
A point estimate for pass-through to pegs that is less than one may reflect either
frictions that delay pass-through (e.g., those described in Section 1.1, or the effects
from sterilizing interventions in currency markets) or anticipated/endogenous interest
rate movements that are not purged from UM.
The 95% CI for UM does not exclude pass-through equal to 0.52, the value esti-
mated from FF. When the standard error bands are calculated by means of clustering
at the country level, the 95% CI for pass-through from UM narrows somewhat to
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[0.46,1.10] but still includes the interest rate pass-through estimated from realized
federal funds rate changes. In this context, it is important to note that FF is an amal-
gam of UM and anticipated and/or endogenous interest rate changes. Pass-through
from FF will be a function of pass-through from these components, including UM.
As pass-through from UM exceeds that from FF by 26 b.p., it is possible that pass-
through from anticipated and/or endogenous elements of U.S. rate changes is much
lower than the 0.52 estimated for FF movements. Formal inferences along these lines
would require a more complete decomposition of federal funds rate movements than
that used in this paper.
Interest rate pass-through to non-pegs is 8 b.p. from UM and 16 b.p. from FF. The
lower level of pass-through from UM is consistent with the claim in Section 1 that
anticipated or endogenous monetary policy may elicit positive pass-through, either
because the covariance between interest rate changes and the change in the expected
rate of depreciation is positive in such cases or because of the effects of common
shocks. However, the contrast in pass-through across policy measures is smaller than
in the peg case, and equality of the two estimates cannot be ruled out given the
estimation uncertainty.
When UM is the foreign interest rate change measure, a joint test of the hypotheses
that pass-through to pegs is unity and pass-through to non-pegs is zero cannot be
rejected at any conventional significance level (p-value of 46%). For FF, the joint test
rejects the two hypotheses. In part, this reflects the greater precision with which the
effects of FF are estimated. However, if we use the covariance matrix from UM and
the point estimates from FF, the two hypotheses are still rejected (p-value of 3.3%).
Thus, smaller estimation uncertainty is not the sole source of the rejection of the joint
hypothesis for pass-through from FF. The magnitudes of the pass-through estimates,
which may reflect influences from anticipated and/or endogenous policy changes,
also contribute to the result.
A comparison of interest rate pass-through across pegs and non-pegs provides a
measure of the constraint on monetary policy as a result of pegging the exchange
rate. When policy is measured using UM, the increment to pass-through associated
with pegging is 70 b.p., compared with 36 b.p. when policy is measured using FF.
Controlling for anticipated and endogenous interest rate changes roughly doubles
the estimated constraint on monetary policy from pegging but also increases the
uncertainty associated with that estimate. In the case of UM, the 68% confidence
interval is [0.46, 0.94] and the 95% confidence interval is [0.22, 1.18]. The latter
interval includes 0.36, the increment to pass-through when policy is measured using
FF. When using clustered standard errors the 95% interval narrows to [0.32, 1.08].
These estimates provide some support for the notion that anticipated or endogenous
components in realized foreign monetary policy changes contribute to a constraint
on monetary policy associated with pegging that is smaller than that implied by the
benchmark trilemma.
Overall, the monthly pass-through estimates are consistent with our argument that
the international propagation of anticipated or endogenous movements in foreign
monetary policy (the United States here) is different from that from unanticipated
and exogenous policy changes. There is evidence that pass-through to pegs and
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non-pegs is closer to the theoretical benchmarks, and that the constraint from peg-
ging is larger than previously believed. However, estimation uncertainty means that
changes to estimated pass-through from the monetary policy identification are not
significant at standard levels.
The R2 statistics are low across all exchange rate regimes and monetary policy
measures. While this might be expected in the case of non-pegs, the result is more
surprising in the case of pegs. We postulate two reasons for low explanatory power.
First, some Home interest rate changes may be responses to domestic concerns that are
unrelated to Foreign interest rate changes. For example, if Home experiences a local
inflation innovation, they will increase their interest rate to prevent their exchange
rate from depreciating, thus maintaining the peg. Second, we have argued that when
the Foreign interest rate changes in an anticipated fashion, the Home interest rate
may respond in advance. Such temporal decoupling of interest rate changes does not
imply that Home is free from Foreign’s influence in setting monetary policy but does
imply a lower R2 for the simple pass-through regression.20 We also note that the R2
for the UM regression is lower than that for the FF regression. This is not surprising
given the econometric endogeneity of FF changes. If endogenous Foreign interest rate
changes include responses to common, international shocks, they will have greater
explanatory power for Home interest rate changes than will changes in UM, from
which such responses are largely eliminated.
3.2 Pass-Through Estimates from Daily Data
In the bottom half of Table 2, we report day-to-day pass-through under pegs and
non-pegs following changes in UM, FF-FUT, and FF. We also present the statistics
and hypothesis tests that were detailed for the monthly results.
In response to a 100 b.p. tightening of U.S. monetary policy, day-to-day pass-
through to pegs is 69 b.p. when policy is measured using UM, 101 b.p. when measured
using FF-FUT, and 20 b.p. when measured using FF. The point estimates for pass-
through from identified monetary policy changes ranges from three and a half to fives
times that from changes in the realized interest rate. However, there is a high degree
of estimation uncertainty associated with all of these estimates—the null of no effect
cannot be rejected for any of the monetary policy measures. Sample size is a likely
driver of the large standard errors. As noted earlier, there are only three countries that
pass the baseline inclusion criteria, have a U.S. dollar peg sometime over the period
1988–2000, and have daily data for an overnight interest rate. They are Canada, Hong
Kong, and Indonesia. In fact, Hong Kong accounts for 85% of the observations in
the sample. Pass-through from FF-FUT is thus extremely similar to that estimated by
Borensztein et al. (2001) for Hong Kong alone (albeit over a different set of days and
interest rate concepts).
Interest rate pass-through to non-pegs is 17 b.p. from UM, 49 b.p. from FF-FUT,
and −5 b.p. from FF. All are estimated with a higher degree of uncertainty than
20. Such logic suggests that a low R2 under a peg does not necessarily signify that pegging entails no
loss of monetary autonomy.
700 : MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING
pass-through to pegs. Despite non-peg pass-throughs from UM and FF-FUT both
being larger than that from FF, the joint hypothesis that peg pass-through is unity
and non-peg pass-through cannot be rejected for either UM or FF-FUT (p-values
over 0.60). However, it is soundly rejected for FF, reflecting the dramatically lower
peg pass-through from FF. As in the monthly sample, the difference between peg
and non-peg pass-through from either identified U.S. interest rate change measure
is approximately double the size of the difference from FF. The daily pass-through
estimates support the picture that emerged from the monthly sample, albeit with a
much higher degree of estimation uncertainty.
4. ROBUSTNESS
In this section, we evaluate the robustness of our main results to various pertur-
bations in our baseline methodology. We consider: (i) the subsample stability of
estimated pass-through, (ii) the use of an alternative capital control classification,
(iii) the use of alternative exchange rate regime classifications, and (iv) a sample re-
stricted to cases where the signs of the identified U.S. monetary policy change and
the realized federal funds rate change coincide.
4.1 Subsample Stability
We estimated the baseline monthly regression over the set of subsamples where
one country at a time is omitted. The key findings are briefly summarized here; full
details are available upon request. Excepting the subsample obtained after excluding
Kuwait, within-month pass-through to pegs ranged from 0.77 to 0.84 following a
change in UM and from 0.49 to 0.53 following a change in FF. Furthermore, evidence
for larger differences between peg and non-peg pass-through when UM is the policy
measure was preserved in each case. The one example of instability occurred when
Kuwait was omitted from the sample. In that case, pass-through under a peg was
0.30 from UM and 0.59 from FF, and the increase in pass-through from pegging was
23 b.p. using UM and 43 b.p using FF. However, further analysis demonstrated that
this instability relates to the timing of pass-through rather than the level. Specifically,
we aggregated the monthly data to an annual frequency and estimated static pass-
through regressions (full details are available in an earlier working paper version
of the paper). When observations for Kuwait are omitted, pass-though to pegs is
0.84 from UM and 0.60 from FF, and the increments to pass-through from pegging
are 55 b.p. using UM and 19 b.p. using FF. These results are similar to those from
the full sample monthly estimates. Thus, while contemporaneous pass-through from
UM to pegs falls somewhat after excluding Kuwait, pass-through in the months that
follow rises much more quickly, as does the increment to pass-through from pegging.
Based on this evidence, we conclude that while interest rate movements in Kuwait
are influential for the estimated timing of pass-through, the same is not true of the
final level of interest rate pass-through, and that evidence supporting the predictions
from Section 1 is observed across the range of countries in our core sample.
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The analysis of cross-sectional stability at the daily frequency requires more cau-
tion. As noted previously, the peg sample comprises just three countries, and one
of them, Hong Kong, accounts for 98 of the 114 observations. When Hong Kong is
excluded from the sample, pass-through to pegs is −0.31 (UM), 1.83 (FF-FUT), and
.09 (FF). Each of these estimates is insignificant at conventional levels. Interest rate
pass-through to non-pegs, which was less than peg pass-through in the full sample,
is more robust across subsamples for each of the three policy measures and, as in the
full sample, is insignificant at conventional levels. Some fragility in the peg results
is unsurprising given the very small sample for which daily overnight interest rate
data are available, and therefore we emphasize the importance of the results from
lower frequency data when assessing the robustness of our result that unanticipated
and exogenous U.S. monetary policy propagates differently to more general interest
rate movements.
4.2 Alternative Capital Control Classification
As noted in Section 2.2, we restrict our baseline samples to include only those
country/time observations from years when international capital flows were un-
restricted, based upon Shambaugh’s (2004) codification of the information in the
IMF’s AREAER. Concerns about the validity of the capital control information in the
AREAER have led to the construction of a variety of alternative international capital
mobility indicators by several researchers (e.g., Quinn 1997, Miniane 2004, Chinn
and Ito 2006, 2008).
Since Chinn and Ito’s (2006, 2008) measure of capital account openness has the
largest spatio-temporal coverage, we use it to construct an alternative binary capital
mobility indicator for our sample. Specifically, we code countries with average capital
account openness that is larger than the grand median of the measure as having mobile
capital, and those with average openness below the grand median as having immobile
capital. This is similar to the split that Miniane and Rogers (2007) implement with
Miniane’s (2004) data in their study. We then combine the Chinn and Ito binary
capital mobility indicator with our other inclusion criteria (see Section 2.2) to derive
a new sample. The monthly and daily samples constructed from the revised inclusion
criteria are larger than their baseline counterparts. The monthly data set contains 8,838
observations; 10% are pegs. The daily data set contains 1,893 observations; 6.2% are
pegs.
The results, presented in Table 3, are similar to the baseline results. However,
precision is higher in the sample based upon the Chinn and Ito binary capital mobility
indicator. In response to a 100 b.p. tightening of U.S. monetary policy, within-month
pass-through to pegs is 81 b.p. when policy is measured using UM and 55 b.p. when
measured using FF. Within-month pass-through to non-pegs is roughly the same across
UM and FF (11 b.p. versus 9 b.p.), although only non-peg pass-through from UM
is statistically insignificant. The difference between within-month peg and non-peg
pass-through from UM is identical to that estimated using Shambaugh’s AREAER-
based capital control indicator (70 b.p.). The difference for FF is about a third larger
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TABLE 3
INTEREST RATE PASS-THROUGH (CHINN–ITO CAPITAL CONTROL MEASURE)
U.S. interest Exchange rate H0: β = 1 H0: βP = 1,
rate measure regime β (p-value) N R2 βP − βNP βNP = 0 (p-value)
Monthly frequency
UM Peg 0.81∗∗ 0.22 887 0.014 0.70∗∗ 0.21
(0.16) (0.18)
Non-peg 0.11 0.00 7,951 0.0002
(0.09)
FF Peg 0.55∗∗ 0.00 887 0.029 0.46∗∗ 0.00
(0.07) (0.08)
Non-peg 0.09∗ 0.00 7,951 0.0005
(0.04)
Daily frequency
UM Peg 0.94∗ 0.89 112 0.045 0.83 0.93
(0.46) (0.56)
Non-peg 0.11 0.00 1,781 0.00
(0.30)
FF-FUT Peg 0.73 0.76 112 0.01 0.34 0.69
(0.88) (1.02)
Non-peg 0.39 0.20 1,781 0.0002
(0.48)
FF Peg 0.03 0.00 112 0.0004 −0.08 0.00
(0.11) (0.20)
Non-peg 0.11 0.00 1,781 0.0003
(0.16)
NOTES: Pass-through statistics measure the within month or day-to-day response of Home interest rates to a 1 percentage point increase in
(i) UM, the unanticipated and exogenous U.S. interest rate measure; (ii) FF, the aggregate intended federal funds rate; and (iii) FF-FUT, the
federal funds futures-based monetary policy shock (only for the daily data). The construction of the US interest rate measures at the two
frequencies is described in the main text. The monthly data cover the period 1972m1–2000m12. The daily data are drawn from 1988m10
to 2000m12. The daily data are the changes in interest rates around scheduled FOMC meetings, as defined in the main text. The exchange
rate regime indicator is from Shambaugh (2004). Standard errors are given in parentheses. ∗ and ∗∗ denote significance at 5% and 1%,
respectively. All standard errors and hypothesis test results are based on bootstrapped covariance matrices that use 1,000 replications.
than that estimated with the baseline sample (46 b.p.). This reflects the lower non-
peg pass-through relative to the baseline. As before, the joint hypothesis of unit peg
pass-through and zero non-peg pass-through is rejected for FF but accepted for UM.
In the daily sample, the results for pass-through from UM are the most consistent
with the trilemma logic. Peg pass-through from UM is 94 b.p. and is significant at the
5% level. Non-peg pass-through from UM is 12 b.p. and is statistically insignificant.
Day-to-day peg pass-through from FF-FUT is smaller (73 b.p.) than that estimated
in the baseline daily sample. There is also no improvement in precision for the FF-
FUT results. Estimated pass-through from FF is the least supportive of the trilemma
logic. Both peg and non-peg pass-through from FF are near zero. In fact, peg pass-
through is lower than non-peg pass-through (3 b.p. versus 11 b.p.). Neither the set of
pass-throughs from FF-FUT or FF is statistically significant at conventional levels.
Overall, the conclusions from the baseline sample hold up extremely well in the
sample based upon an alternative capital control classification. The results also lend
some stronger support to the assertion that the use of unanticipated and exogenous
identified foreign interest rate changes is critical in evaluations of the trilemma with
high-frequency data.
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4.3 Alternative Exchange Rate Regime Classifications
We examine the sensitivity of our results to Shambaugh’s exchange rate regime
classification by estimating pass-through under updated versions of the classifications
due to Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003). Ilzetzki,
Reinhart, and Rogoff (2008a, 2008b) provide a monthly classification that updates
the four-way coding compiled by Reinhart and Rogoff. The regimes are: hard pegs,
crawling pegs, crawling pegs with bands, and free floats.21 Reinhart and Rogoff’s clas-
sification scheme therefore allows for more heterogeneity in pass-through across the
non-peg sample than does the baseline classification.22 Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger
(2005a, 2005b) update the classification from Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003),
who use evidence from foreign exchange interventions to identify de facto pegs. If
a currency is officially labeled as a peg but foreign exchange reserves do not show
the volatility associated with interventions to support a peg, they exclude the regime
from consideration. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger also differentiate between floats
and dirty floats/intermediate regimes, thus allowing for some heterogeneity among
non-pegs.
The sample comprises only observations designated as having a U.S. base by
Shambaugh (2004) (i.e., there is no reclassification of non-U.S. bases).23 Reclassifi-
cation would be somewhat more involved when there are multiple non-peg categories.
When we use the Reinhart and Rogoff measure (hereafter, RR), the monthly sample
consists of 2,407 observations (16.5% are hard pegs and 50.2% are crawling pegs).
The daily sample consists of 614 observations (18.6% are hard pegs and 33.5% are
crawling pegs). When we use the Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger measure (hereafter,
LYS), the monthly sample consists of 2373 observations (29.9% are fixes and 18.2%
are intermediates). The daily sample consists of 627 observations (28.7% fixes and
15.9% intermediates). We apply the inclusion criteria described in Section 2.2. All
samples are subsamples from the corresponding baseline cases described in the pre-
vious section.
Table 4 shows monthly and daily pass-through under the four categories identified
by RR.24 The monthly results indicate higher levels of interest rate pass-through
to hard pegs and crawling pegs than to managed floats and freely floating regimes,
and interest rate transmission for the first two categories is stronger when estimated
using UM as opposed to FF. The main puzzle is that pass-through to hard pegs is
21. An additional fifth category is specified for freely falling exchange rates associated with exchange
rate crises or periods in which inflation in the Home country exceeds 40%. We do not include this group
in our analysis.
22. It should be noted, however, that the crawling peg with bands category is tiny in our sample (20 or
fewer observations).
23. We checked that each country identified by Shambaugh (2004) as having a U.S. base is similarly
identified under the alternative regime classifications.
24. These results are estimated from smaller samples than are the baseline results, given data availability.
If within month pass-through is estimated using the Shambaugh classification and the restricted samples
the results are very similar to the baseline results. Reestimating daily interest rate pass-through yields
similar pass-through to pegs, while non-peg pass-through drops below zero in the case of UM and FF but
rises to 1.13 in the case of FF-FUT.
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TABLE 4
INTEREST RATE PASS-THROUGH (REINHART–ROGOFF EXCHANGE RATE CLASSIFICATION)
U.S. interest Exchange rate H0: β = 1
rate measure regime β (p-value) N R2
Monthly frequency
UM Hard peg 0.25 0.09 397 0.001
(0.44)
Crawling peg 0.48∗ 0.02 1,208 0.003
(0.23)
Managed float −0.55 0.83 20 0.001
(7.15)
Freely floating −0.13 0.00 782 0.002
(0.13)
FF Hard peg 0.14 0.00 397 0.001
(0.20)
Crawling peg 0.29∗∗ 0.00 1,208 0.005
(0.10)
Managed float −0.56 0.72 20 0.001
(4.37)
Freely floating 0.04 0.00 782 0.001
(0.07)
Daily frequency
UM Hard peg 0.53 0.38 114 0.013
(0.54)
Crawling peg −0.80 0.32 206 0.0004
(1.82)
Managed float −1.51 0.18 14 0.094
(1.87)
Freely floating 0.01 0.00 280 0.00
(0.14)
FF-FUT Hard peg 0.85 0.86 114 0.012
(0.86)
Crawling peg 2.56 0.66 206 0.002
(3.58)
Managed float 5.85 0.35 14 0.153
(5.22)
Freely floating −0.13 0.00 280 0.002
(0.28)
FF Hard peg 0.23 0.00 114 0.017
(0.15)
Crawling peg −1.35 0.00 206 0.008
(0.81)
Managed float 0.71 0.72 14 0.037
(0.83)
Freely floating 0.07 0.00 280 0.01
(0.05)
NOTES: Pass-through statistics measure the within month or day-to-day response of Home interest rates to a 1 percentage point increase in
(i) UM, the unanticipated and exogenous U.S. interest rate measure; (ii) FF, the aggregate intended federal funds rate; and (iii) FF-FUT, the
federal funds futures-based monetary policy shock (only for the daily data). The construction of the U.S. interest rate measures at the two
frequencies is described in the main text. The monthly data cover the period 1972m1–2000m12. The daily data are drawn from 1988m10 to
2000m12. The daily data are the changes in interest rates around scheduled FOMC meetings, as defined in the main text. The underlying
capital mobility indicator is from Shambaugh (2004). Standard errors are given in parentheses. ∗ and ∗∗ denote significance at 5% and 1%,
respectively. All standard errors and hypothesis test results are based on bootstrapped covariance matrices that use 1,000 replications.
less than pass-through to crawling pegs using both policy measures. A comparison
of the Shambaugh and RR classifications helps cast light on this puzzle. The sample
of 1,208 crawling pegs contains 203 observations from Shambaugh’s peg category,
including observations for Kuwait, a country whose inclusion in the sample matters
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for the speed of interest rate transmission (see Section 4.1). Estimated pass-through
for this group of 203 observations from UM is 0.93. Clearly, this group is important
in driving both the baseline peg estimates in Table 2 and the crawling peg results in
Table 4. The reason for higher pass-through to the Shambaugh pegs that RR label
crawling pegs than to the Shambaugh pegs that RR label hard pegs is unclear. One
possibility is that the crawling pegs commit to a local trend in the exchange rate, but
their discretion to deviate from that path is actually less than the deviations from a
stationary target allowed for hard pegs.
Estimates of interest rate pass-through to the RR regime classifications are statisti-
cally insignificant. In terms of magnitudes, pass-through to hard pegs is comparable
to pass-through to pegs in the baseline daily results. The difference between hard peg
and freely floating pass-through is larger using the identified policy measures than it is
using realized interest rate changes. The magnitude of the hard peg estimate reflects
the fact that over 90% of the baseline peg sample is included in the RR hard peg
sample; proportionately, the sample attrition is much less than in the monthly case.
The anomaly in the daily results occurs in the case of the crawling pegs, for which
pass-through is negative using FF and UM but in excess of 200% using FF-FUT.
Given that these estimates are highly insignificant (much more so than in the monthly
estimates for crawling pegs), we do not emphasize them here.
Table 5 shows the same output under the three categories identified by LYS. An
important point to bear in mind when considering these results is that there is less
agreement between the Shambaugh and LYS codings than between the Shambaugh
and RR codings. For example, in the monthly data, each of the three groups identified
by LYS contains both pegs and non-pegs from the Shambaugh classification, and
approximately 30% of the LYS fixes are non-pegs in the baseline Shambaugh coding.
Furthermore, when the results from the Shambaugh coding are reestimated using
the subsample for which the LYS classification is available, the within month peg-
pass-through from UM is 0.32, and the non-peg pass-through 0.18. Using the LYS
classification alters the sample such that even the results from our baseline regime
coding are sensitive. In Table 5, the within month pass-through to LYS intermediates
is larger from UM than from FF, but the same is not true for LYS fixes (recall that
the LYS fixes are a mixture of pegs and non-pegs from the Shambaugh coding).
The daily LYS results indicate larger wedges between pass-through to fixes and floats
using identified policy measures, consistent with the baseline results, but pass-through
to the intermediate category is not always higher for an identified measure than it
is for FF.
Overall, the results from the LYS classification of exchange rate regimes reveal
some differences relative to our baseline estimates. Shambaugh (2004) also finds that
estimated pass-through is sensitive to the use of the LYS classification and argues
that his classification is more appropriate for evaluating interest rate transmission.
Accordingly, we emphasize our core results ahead of those in Table 5, particularly
given the increased estimation uncertainty associated with the smaller samples from
the alternative regime classifications.
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TABLE 5
INTEREST RATE PASS-THROUGH (LEVY-YEYATI/STURZENEGGER EXCHANGE RATE CLASSIFICATION)
U.S. interest Exchange rate H0: β = 1
rate measure regime β (p-value) N R2
Monthly frequency
UM Fix 0.39 0.21 709 0.001
(0.49)
Intermediate 0.52 0.52 433 0.001
(0.75)
Float 0.12 0.00 1,231 0.001
(0.17)
FF Fix 0.47∗∗ 0.00 709 0.004
(0.18)
Intermediate −0.02 0.00 433 0.00
(0.21)
Float 0.13 0.00 1,231 0.003
(0.08)
Daily frequency
UM Fix 0.83 0.94 180 0.00
(2.32)
Intermediate −0.15 0.43 100 0.00
(1.45)
Float −0.03 0.00 347 0.00
(0.13)
FF-FUT Fix 4.71 0.56 180 0.003
(6.40)
Intermediate 1.26 0.91 100 0.001
(2.35)
Float −0.10 0.00 347 0.001
(0.25)
FF Fix −1.73 0.01 180 0.01
(1.00)
Intermediate 0.75 0.69 100 0.011
(0.64)
Float 0.11∗ 0.00 347 0.017
(0.05)
NOTES: Pass-through statistics measure the within month or day-to-day response of Home interest rates to a 1 percentage point increase in
(i) UM, the unanticipated and exogenous U.S. interest rate measure; (ii) FF, the aggregate intended federal funds rate; and (iii) FF-FUT, the
federal funds futures-based monetary policy shock (only for the daily data). The construction of the U.S. interest rate measures at the two
frequencies is described in the main text. The monthly data cover the period 1972m1–2000m12. The daily data are drawn from 1988m10 to
2000m12. The daily data are the changes in interest rates around scheduled FOMC meetings, as defined in the main text. The underlying
capital mobility indicator is from Shambaugh (2004). Standard errors are given in parentheses. ∗ and ∗∗ denote significance at 5% and 1%,
respectively. All standard errors and hypothesis test results are based on bootstrapped covariance matrices that use 1,000 replications.
4.4 Coincidence of Identified and Realized U.S. Monetary Policy Change Signs
Shambaugh (2004) makes the point that identified policy shocks can arise when
interest rates do not change, but fundamentals predict that they should change. A
natural question is whether pass-through is expected to occur in such instances. Our
perspective is that it should. When fundamentals point to a foreign interest rate change,
exchange rate expectations may adjust in advance, thereby forcing countries that
peg to adjust their interest rates in order to maintain exchange rate stability. If the
foreign interest rate does not in fact change, a negative foreign interest rate shock is
recorded. In response, countries that peg can reverse any interest rate increases that
market pressures had forced upon them, yielding interest rate pass-through. In order
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TABLE 6
INTEREST RATE PASS-THROUGH (IF SGN[IDENTIFIED U.S. MP ] = SGN[FF])
U.S. interest Exchange rate H0: β = 1 H0: βP = 1,
rate measure regime β (p-value) N R2 βP − βNP βNP = 0 (p-value)
Monthly frequency
UM Peg 0.86∗∗ 0.54 395 0.024 0.65∗∗ 0.14
(0.23) (0.25)
Non-peg 0.21 0.00 2,906 0.001
(0.11)
FF Peg 0.51∗∗ 0.00 395 0.033 0.38∗∗ 0.00
(0.10) (0.10)
Non-peg 0.12∗∗ 0.00 2,906 0.002
(0.05)
Daily Frequency
UM Peg 1.53∗ 0.42 70 0.089 1.45∗ 0.68
(0.66) (0.71)
Non-peg 0.08 0.01 937 0.000
(0.35)
FF Peg 0.21 0.00 70 0.012 0.22 0.00
(0.22) (0.29)
Non-peg −0.004 0.00 937 0.000
(0.17)
FF-FUT Peg 1.14 0.91 76 0.028 0.46 0.48
(1.30) (1.47)
Non-peg 0.68 0.57 1,019 0.001
(0.55)
FF Peg 0.20 0.00 76 0.019 0.24 0.00
(0.16) (0.21)
Non-peg −0.04 0.00 1,019 0.000
(0.12)
NOTES: Pass-through statistics measure the within month or day-to-day response of Home interest rates to a 1 percentage point increase in
(i) UM, the unanticipated and exogenous U.S. interest rate measure; (ii) FF, the aggregate intended federal funds rate; and (iii) FF-FUT, the
federal funds futures-based monetary policy shock (only for the daily data). The construction of the US interest rate measures at the two
frequencies is described in the main text. The monthly data cover the period 1972m1–2000m12. The daily data are drawn from 1988m10
to 2000m12. The daily data are the changes in interest rates around scheduled FOMC meetings, as defined in the main text. The exchange
rate regime indicator and underlying capital mobility indicator are both from Shambaugh (2004). Note that the sample inclusion criteria here
result in no observations where FF = 0 being included. Standard errors are given in parentheses. ∗ and ∗∗ denote significance at 5% and 1%,
respectively. All standard errors and hypothesis test results are based on bootstrapped covariance matrices that use 1,000 replications.
to investigate this issue empirically, we reestimate our baseline results after excluding
observations if (i) the change in FF is exactly zero, or (ii) the sign of the identified
policy change is different from the sign of the FF change. The second condition
accounts for cases in which the policy rate changes, but by less than fundamentals
predict, such that the identified shock is of opposite sign to the actual FF change.
Note that the second condition requires separate subsamples, one based on UM/FF
sign comparisons and one based on FF-FUT/FF sign comparisons.
The results are presented in Table 6. At the monthly frequency our estimates change
very little relative to the baseline case; only non-peg pass-through from UM varies
by more than just a few basis points. This suggests that interest rate shocks arising
when there is no change in FF are propagated internationally in the same way as
shocks generated when the intended policy rate does change. At the daily frequency,
there is evidence of higher levels of pass-through to pegs from identified interest
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rate changes that are of the same sign as FF changes. Although the changes in pass-
through are small relative to the estimation uncertainty, it is noteworthy that interest
rate pass-through to pegs from UM is significant at the 5% level in the restricted
sample. Furthermore, pass-through to pegs from UM increases relative to that from
FF, and the increment to pass-through associated with pegging is 145 b.p. in the UM
case, compared to just 22 b.p. in the FF case. Overall, our argument that interest rate
pass-through does not depend on whether FF actually changes is supported at the
monthly frequency but not the daily frequency, possibly indicating that interest rates
around the world take time to adjust to interest rate surprises occurring as a result of
inaction after FOMC meetings.
5. CONCLUSION
We have argued that the nature of Foreign interest rate changes is important in un-
derstanding Foreign’s interest rate transmission to Home’s interest rate, conditional
upon the bilateral exchange rate regime. Under an imperfectly credible peg, antici-
pated or endogenous Foreign interest rate changes will lead to less than unit estimated
interest rate pass-through because their covariance with unobserved changes in the
expected rate of depreciation and the risk premium is negative. In contrast, unantic-
ipated and exogenous interest rate changes will generate positive covariances with
the unobserved variables, leading to estimated pass-through under a peg that exceeds
unity. This implies that the identification of Foreign interest rate changes influences
the interpretation of estimated interest rate pass-through and thus inference regarding
the relevance of the monetary policy trilemma.
Our results indicated the difference between within-month pass-through to pegs
and non-pegs from an identified U.S. interest rate change is twice that from a realized
U.S. interest rate change. Pass-through to a peg from an identified U.S. interest rate
change is also much closer to unity (a simple trilemma benchmark) than it is from a
realized U.S. interest rate change. Interest rate pass-through estimated from daily data
illustrates the contrast even more starkly. Pass-through to a peg from identified U.S.
interest rate changes (via either the Romer and Romer–style procedure or the Kuttner-
style futures-based procedure) is three to five times as large as that seen from realized
U.S. interest rate changes. The wedge between peg and non-peg pass-through follow-
ing an identified U.S. interest rate change is again roughly twice that from a change to
the actual interest rate. However, estimation uncertainty in the daily sample is high.
Our results have implications for future empirical and theoretical studies. They
indicate that a consideration of the nature of foreign interest rate changes should
be included in empirical evaluations of international interest rate transmission. The
appropriate interpretation of estimated pass-through depends upon the identification
of foreign interest rate changes. We focused upon unanticipated and exogenous for-
eign interest rate changes. In future extensions, researchers might investigate how
different properties (e.g., rate changes that are directly attributable to changes in the
expectations of specific macroeconomic conditions) affect international transmission.
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TABLE A1
SAMPLE COMPOSITION
Monthly Daily
Starts Ends Starts Ends
Country Year Month Year Month Year Month Year Month
Peg observations
Argentina 1993 2 2000 12
Bahrain 1985 8 1997 7
Bahrain 1997 10 2000 12
Canada 1990 2 1991 12 1991 2 1991 12
El Salvador 1997 2 2000 12
Hong Kong 1994 2 2000 12 1988 11 2000 12
Indonesia 1992 2 1993 12 1993 2 1993 12
Kuwait 1979 2 1980 12
Kuwait 1993 2 2000 12
Malaysia 1989 2 1991 12
Nonpeg observations
Australia 1984 2 2000 12 1988 11 2000 12
Austria 1991 2 1998 12 1992 2 1998 12
Belgium 1973 2 1998 12
Bolivia 1995 2 2000 12
Canada 1975 2 1989 12 1992 2 2000 12
Canada 1992 1 2000 12
Denmark 1988 2 2000 12 1997 2 2000 12
Eurozone 1999 2 2000 12
Finland 1991 2 1998 12 1992 2 1998 12
France 1990 2 1998 12 1991 2 1998 12
Germany 1973 2 1998 12 1988 11 1998 12
Guatemala 1997 2 2000 12
Indonesia 1983 2 1984 3 1988 11 1991 12
Indonesia 1985 2 1985 12 1994 2 2000 12
Indonesia 1986 6 1991 12
Indonesia 1994 1 2000 12
Ireland 1992 2 1998 12 1993 2 1998 12
Italy 1990 2 1998 12 1991 2 1998 12
Japan 1979 2 2000 12 1989 2 2000 12
Kuwait 1981 1 1990 7
Kuwait 1992 12 1992 12
Luxembourg 1990 2 1998 12
Malaysia 1973 2 1988 12 1993 8 1997 12
Malaysia 1992 1 1997 12
Maldives 1987 2 1989 12
Maldives 1993 2 1993 12
Mexico 1981 5 1981 12
Netherlands 1975 2 1998 12 1988 11 1998 12
New Zealand 1985 2 2000 12 1988 11 2000 12
Norway 1995 2 2000 12 1996 1 2000 12
Peru 1995 11 1995 12
Portugal 1993 2 1998 12
Singapore 1978 2 1998 12 1988 11 1998 12
Spain 1994 2 1998 12 1995 2 1998 12
Sweden 1993 2 2000 12 1994 2 2000 12
Switzerland 1992 2 2000 12 1993 2 2000 12
United Kingdom 1979 2 2000 12 1988 11 2000 12
Uruguay 1996 2 2000 12
Vanuatu 1986 6 1986 12
Vanuatu 1988 2 1989 12
Vanuatu 1992 2 1992 12
Vanuatu 1998 2 2000 12
Venezuela 1988 2 1989 12 1997 2 2000 12
NOTE: Dates indicate the start and end month for each country time series included in the samples used for the monthly and daily regressions.
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TABLE A2
DATA SOURCES
Variable Source
Monthly home money market rates
(overnight, interbank)
International Financial Statistics (January 2008), series
60B.ZF
Daily home money market rates (overnight,
interbank)
Global Financial Data (various data series)
U.S. federal funds rate International Financial Statistics (January 2008), series
60B.ZF
Federal funds futures settlement prices Chicago Board of Trade
Intended federal funds rate changes/levels Romer and Romer (2004) available at:
http://www.e-aer.org/data/sept04 data romer.zip
Post-1996, announced target changes available at:
http://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/fundsrate.htm
Federal Reserve Greenbook forecasts Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, available at:
http://philadelphiafed.org/econ/forecast/
Exchange rate regime classification Shambaugh (2004) available at:
http://www.dartmouth.edu/∼jshambau/
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) available at:
http://www.wam.umd.edu/∼creinhar/Papers.html
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) available at:
http://profesores.utdt.edu/∼fsturzen/Publications.htm
Capital controls indicator Shambaugh (2004) available at:
http://www.dartmouth.edu/∼jshambau/
Hyperinflation indicator Shambaugh (2004) available at:
http://www.dartmouth.edu/∼jshambau/
Administratively set rate indicator Shambaugh (2004) available at:
http://www.dartmouth.edu/∼jshambau/
Chinn–Ito capital controls measure Chinn and Ito (2006, 2008) available at:
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/∼mchinn/research.html
TABLE A3
MODEL DIAGNOSTICS
Autocorrelation tests Parameter homogeneity tests
Peg Nonpeg Peg Nonpeg
UM Monthly −1.67 −2.32 6.16 30.84
p-value = 0.10 p-value = 0.02 p-value = 0.52 p-value = 0.53
Daily 0.07 0.08 1.75 18.64
p-value = 0.50 p-value = 0.19 p-value = 0.42 p-value = 0.61
FF Monthly −1.7 −2.33 13.78 56.2
p-value = 0.09 p-value = 0.02 p-value = 0.06 p-value = 0.01
Daily 0.07 0.08 0.65 9.14
p-value = 0.51 p-value = 0.19 p-value = 0.72 p-value = 0.99
FF-FUT Daily 0.06 0.08 1.53 16.23
p-value = 0.60 p-value = 0.20 p-value = 0.47 p-value = 0.76
NOTE: The monthly autocorrelation test is an LM test of the null hypotheses of no first-order error autocorrelation. The daily autocorrelation
test is the robust t-ratio for the slope coeffiecient in a regression of the daily regression residual from the current meeting on the daily
regression residual from the previous meeting. The parameter homogeneity tests are chi-square tests of the null of equality of slope
coefficients across countries. All tests are based on regressions that use Shambaugh’s exchange rate regime classification. The test statistics
for parameter homogeneity are calculated using standard errors obtained from 1,000 bootstrap replications. All p-values are calculated using
the asymptotic distributions for the test statistics.
JOHN C. BLUEDORN AND CHRISTOPHER BOWDLER : 711
LITERATURE CITED
Bernanke, Ben S., and Jean Boivin. (2003) “Monetary Policy in a Data-rich Environment.”
Journal of Monetary Economics, 50, 525–46.
Bernanke, Ben S., and Kenneth N. Kuttner. (2005) “What Explains the Stock Market’s Reaction
to Federal Reserve Policy?” Journal of Finance, 60, 1221–57.
Bluedorn, John C., and Christopher Bowdler. (2008) “The Open Economy Consequences of
U.S. Monetary Policy.” Manuscript, Universities of Southampton and Oxford.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. (2005) The Federal Reserve System Purposes and
Functions, 9th ed. Washington, DC: Publications Fulfillment, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve.
Borensztein, Eduardo, Jeromin Zettelmeyer, and Thomas Philippon. (2001) “Monetary Inde-
pendence in Emerging Markets: Does the Exchange Rate Regime Make a Difference?” IMF
Working Paper No. WP/01/1.
Brownstone, David, and Robert Valletta. (2001) “The Bootstrap and Multiple Imputations:
Harnessing Increased Computing Power for Improved Statistical Tests.” Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 15, 129–41.
Chinn, Menzie D., and Hiro Ito. (2006) “What Matters for Financial Development? Capital
Controls, Institutions, and Interactions.” Journal of Development Economics, 81, 163–92.
Chinn, Menzie D., and Hiro Ito. (2008) “A New Measure of Financial Openness.” Journal of
Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 10, 309–22.
Clarida, Richard, and Daniel Waldman. (2008) “Is Bad News about Inflation Good News for
the Exchange Rate? And, If So, Can That Tell Us Anything about the Conduct of Monetary
Policy?” In Asset Prices and Monetary Policy, edited by John Y. Campbell, pp. 371–96.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Drazen, Allan, and Stefan Hubrich. (2006) “A Simple Test of the Effect of Interest Rate
Defense.” NBER Working Paper No. 12616.
Engel, Charles. (1992) “On the Foreign Exchange Risk Premium in a General Equilibrium
Model.” Journal of International Economics, 32, 305–19.
Engel, Charles, and Jeffrey Frankel. (1984) “Why Interest Rates React to Money Announce-
ments: An Explanation from the Foreign Exchange Market.” Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, 13, 31–9.
Faust, Jon, and Jonathan H. Wright. (2008) “Efficient Forecast Tests for Conditional Policy
Forecasts.” Journal of Econometrics, 146, 293–303.
Faust, Jon, John H. Rogers, Shing-Yi Wang, and Jonathan H. Wright. (2007) “The High Fre-
quency Response of Exchange Rates and Interest Rates to Macroeconomic Announcements.”
Journal of Monetary Economics, 54, 1051–68.
Flood, Robert P., and Andrew K. Rose. (1995) “Fixing Exchange Rates: A Virtual Quest for
Fundamentals.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 36, 3–37.
Frankel, Jeffrey, Sergio L. Schmukler, and Luis Serve´n. (2004) “Global Transmission of Interest
Rates: Monetary Independence and Currency Regime.” Journal of International Money and
Finance, 23, 701–33.
Hamilton, James D. (2007) “Assessing Monetary Policy Effects Using Daily Fed Funds Futures
Contracts.” NBER Working Paper No. 13569.
Hendry, David F. (1995) “Dynamic Econometrics.” Advanced Texts in Econometrics, Vol. 34,
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
712 : MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING
Ilzetzki, Ethan, Carmen M. Reinhart, and Kenneth S. Rogoff. (2008a, May) “Country
Chronologies and Background Material to Exchange Rate Arrangements in the 21st
Century: Which Anchor Will Hold?” http://terpconnect.umd.edu/∼creinhar/ Papers/ERA-
Country%20chronologies.pdf.
Ilzetzki, Ethan, Carmen M. Reinhart, and Kenneth S. Rogoff (2008b, May) “Ex-
change Rate Arrangements in the 21st Century: Which Anchor Will Hold?”
http://terpconnect.umd.edu/∼creinhar/Data/ERA-Monthly%20coarse%20class.xls.
Kuttner, Kenneth N. (2001) “Monetary Policy Surprises and Interest Rates: Evidence from the
Fed Funds Futures Market.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 47, 523–44.
Levy-Yeyati, Eduardo, and Federico Sturzenegger. (2003) “To Float or to Fix: Evidence on
the Impact of Exchange Rate Regimes on Growth.” American Economic Review, 93, 1173–
93.
Levy-Yeyati, Eduardo, and Federico Sturzenegger. (2005a) “Classifying Exchange Rate
Regimes: Deeds vs. Words.” European Economic Review, 49, 1603–35.
Levy-Yeyati, Eduardo, and Federico Sturzenegger. (2005b, October) “Update to De Facto
Exchange Rate Classification.” http://profesores.utdt.edu/∼fsturzen/Base 2005.zip.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. (1982) “Interest Rates and Currency Prices in a Two-Country World.”
Journal of Monetary Economics, 10, 335–59.
Miniane, Jacques. (2004) “A New Set of Measures of Capital Account Restrictions.” IMF Staff
Papers, 51, 276–308.
Miniane, Jacques, and John H. Rogers. (2007) “Capital Controls and the International Trans-
mission of U.S. Money Shocks.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 39, 1003–
35.
Obstfeld, Maurice, and Kenneth Rogoff. (1995) “Exchange Rate Dynamics Redux.” Journal
of Political Economy, 102, 624–60.
Obstfeld, Maurice, Jay C. Shambaugh, and Alan M. Taylor. (2004) “Monetary Sovereignty,
Exchange Rates, and Capital Controls: The Trilemma in the Interwar Period.” IMF Staff
Papers, 51, 75–108.
Obstfeld, Maurice, Jay C. Shambaugh, and Alan M. Taylor. (2005) “The Trilemma in History:
Tradeoffs among Exchange Rates, Monetary Policies, and Capital Mobility.” Review of
Economics and Statistics, 87, 423–38.
Orphanides, Athanasios. (2003) “Historical Monetary Policy Analysis and the Taylor rule.”
Journal of Monetary Economics, 50, 983–1022.
Orphanides, Athanasios. (2004) “Monetary Policy Rules, Macroeconomic Stability, and Infla-
tion: A View from the Trenches.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 36, 151–75.
Pagan, Adrian R. (1984) “Econometric Issues in the Analysis of Regressions with Generated
Regressors.” International Economic Review, 25, 221–48.
Quinn, Dennis. (1997) “The Correlates of Change in International Financial Regulation.”
American Political Science Review, 91, 531–51.
Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth S. Rogoff. (2004) “The Modern History of Exchange Rate
Arrangements: A Re-interpretation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, 1–48.
Romer, Christina D., and David H. Romer. (2000) “Federal Reserve Information and the
Behavior of Interest Rates.” American Economic Review, 90, 429–57.
Romer, Christina D., and David H. Romer. (2004) “A New Measure of Monetary Shocks:
Derivation and Implications.” American Economic Review, 94, 1055–84.
JOHN C. BLUEDORN AND CHRISTOPHER BOWDLER : 713
Romer, Christina D., and David H. Romer. (2008) “The FOMC versus the Staff: Where Can
Monetary Policymakers Add Value?” NBER Working Paper No. 13751.
Rose, Andrew K. (1996) “Explaining Exchange Rate Volatility: An Empirical Analysis of ‘The
Holy Trinity’ of Monetary Independence, Fixed Exchange Rates, and Capital Mobility.”
Journal of International Money and Finance, 15, 925–45.
Shambaugh, Jay C. (2004) “The Effect of Fixed Exchange Rates on Monetary Policy.” Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 119, 301–52.
